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Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
This article argues that it is possible to explain the European Union’s
reluctant attitude towards Turkey’s membership in the EU on the
basis of the EU’s international and security identity and Turkey’s
security culture and perception of Europe. The EU’s final decision on
Turkey’s accession is dependent both on Turkey’s performance in
adopting the EU’s distinctive security identity and on the continua-
tion of the EU member-states’ commitment to turning the EU into an
international actor with vital security interests in Turkey’s vicinity.
On the basis of this reasoning, the article reaches two main con-
clusions. The first is that the prospects for Turkey’s EU membership
are better in the post-11 September era than they were in the 1990s.
The second is that there is a close relationship between the way the
EU accession process unfolds and the way Turkey and the EU see
each other. The longer the accession process lasts and the more
ambiguously the EU reacts towards Turkey’s membership, the more
likely Turkey and the EU will view each other as ‘security threats’
rather than ‘security providers’. 
THE MAIN ARGUMENT OF THIS ARTICLE is that one cannot make aconvincing analysis of Turkey’s EU membership prospects withoutuncovering the security rationales of Turkey and the European Union
with regard to each other. From the earliest encounters between the two
sides, a security-based rationality has been decisive in setting the tone of
mutual relationships. Prior to this, and until the end of the Ottoman Empire,
Europe and Turkey had perceived each other mainly as enemies and rivals
(Neumann, 1999: 39–63).
This situation was faced with a critical challenge in the early 1920s as the
founders of the Turkish Republic decided to break with the legacy of rela-
tions between Europe and the Ottoman Empire by turning the direction 
of the country towards Europe as the ideal destination of civilization and
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modernization. The Europe-friendly features of Turkish foreign policy dur-




nönü were solidified in
the aftermath of World War II, as Turkey and the Western European states
stood shoulder to shoulder as NATO allies against the common threat of
communism. The intergovernmental nature of NATO membership, the 
existence of the common external enemy and Turkey’s contribution to the
realization of Europe’s strategic security interests prevented the Europeans
from perceiving Turkey as an ‘other’ throughout the Cold War years. Turkey
was considered to be a part of Europe’s ‘self’ (Aybet & Müftüler-Baç, 2000).
However, this cooperative togetherness started to change with the advent
of the post-Cold War era, as the contours of European-ness began to be
defined by membership in the European Union (Diez & Whitman, 2002).
Despite all of Turkey’s attempts to join the EU as a full member, the latter
seems to have adopted a highly critical view on this issue. Even though a
number of economic, social, cultural and political factors might account for
the greater part of the EU’s negative attitude towards Turkey’s full member-
ship (Müftüler-Baç, 1997), the emphasis here will be on geopolitical and
security-related ones. This is not to claim that these factors supplant the 
others: they simply supplement them in an endeavour to produce a clearer
picture of Turkey–EU relations.
This article will first of all examine the EU’s distinctive international 
and security identity in order to explain the EU’s geopolitical and security-
related concerns vis-à-vis Turkey’s membership. Attention will then focus on
the logic of the EU enlargement process, with a view to highlighting the close
link between the EU’s international identity and the terms of the EU acces-
sion process. Afterwards, the analysis will focus on Turkey’s perception of
Europe and the EU accession criteria in view of Turkey’s security culture.
The article will have two major conclusions. The first is that Turkey’s EU
membership prospects seem to be more promising in the post-11 September
era than they were during the 1990s. The second is that there is a close 
relationship between the way the EU accession process unfolds and the way
Turkey and the EU see each other. The longer the accession process lasts and
the more ambiguous the EU reaction towards Turkey’s membership, the
more likely Turkey and the EU will be to view each other as ‘security threats’
rather than ‘security providers’. 
The International Identity of the European Union
The main contention of this section is that the evolution of the European
Union in the fifty or so years since the onset of Cold War era has resulted in
a distinctive security tradition in Europe. Without understanding this, one
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cannot hope to comprehend the current logic of the EU accession process,
because the EU’s accession criteria are constituted by its distinctive security
identity. The EU-based Europe, in the aftermath of World War II, was no
longer a conglomerate of fully independent states with their distinctive
domestic and foreign attributes preserved. Indeed, the EU’s integration
process started to change the rules of the Westphalian interstate order in
Europe by rendering the logic of balance-of-power politics redundant
(Wæver, 1998a).
While it is mostly claimed that NATO was the main security organization
during the Cold War years, one should not underestimate the role of the EU
in the maintenance of peace and security in Western Europe (Wæver, 1998b).
Forming a collective defence alliance against the Soviet Union proved to be
much easier than the efforts to address the balance-of-power logic among the
old belligerent powers of Western Europe. The latter became possible
through the ‘politicization’ of potential security issues. The logic was that if
potential security issues were cast in political terms, it would be more diffi-
cult for power-holders to conceptualize them as security issues, which
would necessitate the threat and use of force in their eradication. Politiciza-
tion of potential security issues could enable the participants to reach com-
promise solutions (Wæver, 1997). The hope was that if Europeans managed
to ‘politicize’ – rather than ‘securitize’ – potential security issues in the
domestic arena, they would more easily repeat the same practice in the
international arena.
However, the crucial point in this regard was, and still is, that a successful
‘desecuritization’ process – which requires a more inclusive self–other rela-
tionship – could become possible only within the post-sovereign and quasi-
imperial institutional environment of the EU (Wæver, 1998b). Given this 
line of thought, if a state remained a unitary, highly authoritarian, overtly
centralized and unicultural polity, it would be nearly impossible for it to be
admitted to the EU, since it would be difficult for a successful domestic and
external politicization process to take root in such a polity. The supranational
characteristics of the EU’s institutional environment would make life easier
only for states that were content with diffusion of sovereignty and pluraliza-
tion of the domestic political order. 
Built upon this Cold War legacy, the 1990s have seen the EU evolve into a
composite civilian–normative international actor, rather than a military one
that mainly exhibits the qualities of a strategic security actor. While the EU’s
civilian power emanates from the huge economic resources of the EU 
members at its disposal, its normative power originates from its ability to
determine the confines of ‘normalcy’ and ‘appropriate state behaviour’ in
global international society (Manners, 2002). The best place to observe this is
in the EU accession processes, where aspirant countries willingly adapt their
socio-economic and political structures to existing EU norms.
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Despite all this, one can still claim that today’s EU also possesses the traits
of an embryonic military actor. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, the EU
has taken some important steps along this route. Following their failures in
the territories of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, the member-
states of the EU have stepped up their efforts to endow the EU with the 
military means necessary to play an efficient role in the management of 
conflicts, at least in Europe.
However, on balance, today’s EU is more of a normative–civilian actor than
a global military one. There is still a certain lack of cohesion among EU mem-
bers with regard to the geopolitical and strategic priorities of the Union. In
geopolitical terms, it seems that the members, particularly those with an
imperial legacy, have more actor-ness than the EU itself as an institution. For
instance, France and the United Kingdom, two former imperial powers, have
led the way in the evolution of the EU’s foreign and defence policy (Ras-
mussen, 2002: 54). Besides, the EU’s determination to make operational a
rapid reaction force of 60,000 by the end of 2003 might seriously founder on
the low military budgets of the member-states (Kapstein, 2002).
Though one can safely claim that the EU is gradually evolving into an 
international actor with a military logic, this in no way accords with the
expectations of the classic realpolitik understanding of security. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the security interests of the EU are achieved
through simultaneous processes of deepening and widening (see Larsen,
2002). Moreover, the European Security and Defence Policy aims at the
establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force, dubbed the European
Army, for tasks of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and conflict
management. The lower end of the Petersberg tasks did not envisage the 
creation of a European army with war-fighting capabilities and capable of
being deployed in any part of the globe. The major goal of the European
Army has been to enable EU members to respond to any former Yugoslavia-
type crises that may occur within the European continent in future
(Rasmussen, 2002: 54).
It seems that the EU’s approach towards the European Army is in accord-
ance with its security understanding and threat perceptions in the post-Cold
War era. It has been observed that the security referents within post-
Westphalian Europe have gradually become ‘society’ and ‘individuals’,
rather than the ‘nation-state’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 23–24). The
EU member-states share the view that today’s world poses no conventional
threats to Europe’s security. To them, the sources of new threats and risks to
European security lie in the unstable regions along the peripheries of
Europe. Problems that might emanate from the unhealthy domestic struc-
tures of these peripheral countries include immigration, ethnic intrastate
wars, environmental pollution, drug-trafficking, organized crime and so on
(Sjursen, 2001). 
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This security logic also manifests itself in the EU’s approach towards the
use of force in dealing with terrorist or other non-conventional security
threats. The European Union has adopted a rather more selective approach
towards both the definition of terrorism and the way to deal with it. The EU
refuses to define all forms of anti-Western (anti-US, anti-EU) and anti-regime
political activities in the ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states of the Greater Middle
Eastern region as ‘terrorism’. And in cases where activities are defined by the
EU as terrorism, the Union tends to deal with them through a policy of
‘engagement’ rather than ‘containment’. European circles question whether
it is possible to eradicate terrorism from the earth without initially rooting
out the socio-political structures that lead to the (re)production of terrorist
activities (Hoffman, 1999).
As for military instruments, the EU members tend to conceptualize these
as means for paving the way for the efficient implementation of a strategy of
‘structural development’. If EU development aid to unstable regions around
Europe’s peripheries is to be successful in rooting out the structural causes
of instability and terrorism, the EU will need at times to rely on military
means (the European Army) (Cornish & Edwards, 2001). The main reason
that EU members are inclined to rely on soft-security measures in their
struggles with terrorism is the EU’s civilian security culture, which does not
idealize the establishment of a war-making European army on a global scale
(Larsen, 2002).
On the basis of this distinctive conceptualization of security within the EU
area, one can safely suggest that Turkey’s accession to the EU might prove
impossible from a security perspective in the short run. Turkey seems to be
too hard a security actor to be digested within the EU’s soft-security envi-
ronment. Furthermore, a great majority of European security analysts concur
that Turkey’s inclusion within the EU might increase ‘conventional threats’
to European security (Buzan & Diez, 1999). To Turkey-sceptic eyes, Turkey’s
EU membership also constitutes another kind of security threat, because
Turkey’s accession would have a divisive impact on the EU’s internal inte-
gration process (Wæver, 1995). Overall, when Turkey’s realpolitik security
and foreign policy practices and its non-European cultural and social char-
acteristics are taken together, a great number of Europeans tend to view
Turkey’s inclusion within the EU as an inhibiting factor in relation to the
EU’s deepening and widening processes. 
The Logic of the Accession/Enlargement Process
The main functions of the EU’s accession process are twofold. One is to pre-
serve and promote the peculiar security identity of the European Union, the
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other to pave the way for the transformation of the EU into an international
actor that differs from other global actors on the basis of its distinctive 
security modelling.
For any country to join the EU, the first requirement is adoption of the con-
ceptual basis and dynamics of the EU’s security modelling. It is only through
this that the EU can feel secure against possible sources of threat that may
originate from the EU’s periphery (Engelbrekt, 2002). The widening of the
EU has been not only an end, but also a means intended to enable the EU’s
members to transform their club into a more powerful international actor in
the global arena. 
Seen in this light, it is neither the performance of the candidate countries in
meeting the accession criteria per se nor their mere geopolitical and geo-
strategic significance, but rather the EU’s ability to absorb them into the EU’s
international identity that appears to define the EU’s response towards
enlargement (Grabbe, 2002). From this perspective, one could read the EU’s
accession process as a special EU strategy aimed at transforming the socio-
political, economic and security make-up of candidate countries in such a
way that their future accession to the EU would not create great obstacles for
the EU’s emerging identity and institutional setup. In sum, the more difficult
it is to absorb a given country into the EU, the more ambiguous and detailed
the accession criteria adopted by the EU towards that particular country.
This is a rational course of action that fits well with the EU’s post-Cold War
deepening process. 
Turkey’s Perception of Europe and the EU Accession
Process in View of Its Security Culture
In analysing the prospects of Turkey’s EU membership from a security per-
spective, one should also examine Turkish perceptions of Europe and the EU
accession process. In doing this, this article will set out two interrelated argu-
ments. One is that the centuries-old Ottoman Empire–Europe interaction
process shaped and constituted Turkey’s security understanding (see
Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). The other is that there is a close relationship between
Turkey’s security culture and the way Turkey reacts to the EU accession
process. 
The Republican elite perceived Europe mainly from a security perspective
that is highly embedded within an ideational logic. More specifically, the
Turkish elites were of the view that in order for Turkey to preserve its terri-
torial integrity and external sovereignty, interstate relations between the
new-born Republic and the major European powers needed to be friendly. It
was clear to them that if they did not want to see the destiny of the Ottoman
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Empire repeated, the enmity- and rivalry-based Europe–Turkey interaction
process needed to be replaced with a friendship-based one. Their hope was
that if the European states perceived Turkey as European, they would not
have to construct their relations with Turkey on the basis of a self–other
dichotomy. Seen in this way, one can claim that Turkey’s Europeanization
efforts are strongly bound to the goal of state survival. 
There were two ways for the Republican elite to prove Turkey’s European-
ness and thus to achieve the ultimate goal of survival. The first consisted of
efforts to transform the internal make-up of Turkish society in accordance
with the European norms of the time. The second was to follow a Europe-
friendly foreign policy by joining European intergovernmental institutions,
of which security-related ones were privileged (see Bozdağlioğlu, 2001:
76–117). On balance, the second option was given primacy because this was
the cheapest and the most cost-efficient way of having Turkey’s European
identity recognized by the Europeans.
Inspired by the late 19th-century positivist credentials of European nation-
alism, the Republican elites adopted an instrumental view towards Europe
in their efforts to eradicate the roots of ‘multi-ethnicism’ and ‘politicization
of religion’ inside Turkey (Mayall, 1997: 22–25). They were helped in this
process by the fact that Europe at that time viewed ‘secularism’ and the
‘homogenous nation-state’ as among the most important constitutive norms
of the European state system.
The Turkish elite were of the view that a stable and secure Turkey–Europe
relationship would consist of the following principles: neither of the parties
would interfere with the domestic affairs of the other; each party would take
the utmost care to respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of
the other; both sides would join forces against common enemies; and
Turkey, as the weaker party of the relationship, would act to preserve and
promote European strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and
Middle Eastern regions.
Based on this particular understanding of Europe–Turkey relations,
Turkey’s security culture reflected the following features: what needed to be
secured were primarily the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of
the country and the secular, unified and homogenous features of the nation-
state; Turkey’s main external security priorities were to preserve the gains of
the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty and the 1960 agreements on Cyprus; in order
for Turkey to feel secure, its strategic preponderance in the Aegean and the
Eastern Mediterranean needed to be maintained and its European identity
should be recognized by the Europeans; the terms of the Sèvres Treaty of
1920 were not to be reimposed on the Turkish nation; and Turkey must never
feel encircled and abandoned.
In the aftermath of the Cold War era, there were no radical changes to
Turkey’s security mentality and perception of Europe, even though the
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Europe of the 1990s was fundamentally different from the Europe of the pre-
war years. The ruling Turkish elite continues to regard developments out-
side its borders as security threats to its national integrity and territory. For
instance, Russia’s aggressive and assertive policies in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus and the attempts of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours to
develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to deliver them
have been considered as conventional threats to Turkey’s security (Bazoğlu-
Sezer, 1992). In addition, when the survival of the homogenous and secular
nation-state was defined as the main security referent, it was not difficult for
the Turkish elite to define Kurdish separatism and political Islam as the
greatest threats facing the country.1
Turkey continued to regard its alliance relationship with the United States
within NATO as the most important link in terms of shoring up its Western
identity and national security. Therefore, Turkey’s major concern during the
post-Cold War era has centred on the question of what will happen if the
Atlantic alliance loses its collective defence characteristic so irreversibly as to
contribute to dilution of the commitments under Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty. Would Turkey continue to feel secure if membership in the new
NATO, including the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and maybe
even Russia, represented membership in a collective security organization
rather than a collective defence one? 
In fact, Turkey’s membership of NATO has shaped, and to a specific degree
constituted, its perception of the West in general and Europe in particular.2
The fact that Turkey stood on a par with the European allies within a Europe-
centred intergovernmental NATO during the Cold War years seems to have
led the Turkish elite to believe that the European state system has not fun-
damentally diverged from Westphalian principles. One can clearly see this
Turkish view in connection with the European Army. Having under-
estimated the impact of the EU’s supranational integration process and dis-
tinctive security identity on the Europeans’ attempt at building an army,
Turkey has rushed to join the European Army as a contractual party. Turkish
elites have interpreted EU actions in this regard as well-designed attempts at
transforming the supranational EU into an intergovernmental global securi-
ty actor. For the majority of them, participation in such an intergovernmental
European security institution would imply confirmation of Turkey’s ‘Euro-
pean’ identity, under a logic that resembles the reasoning behind Turkey’s
approach to NATO. Inspired by this mentality, some have even argued that
the EU agreed to Turkey’s candidacy in Helsinki in 1999 because of Turkey’s
half-century-long NATO membership, advanced military capabilities and
significant geostrategic location (Müftüler-Baç, 2000). However, it should be
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emphasized that candidacy is something fundamentally different from full
membership. The fact that strategic considerations may have played a role in
Turkey’s candidacy and its placement in the EU’s orbit should not lead one
to mistake candidacy for membership. 
In response to the EU’s negative stance on its participation in the decision-
making mechanisms of the emerging European Army as an equal party,
Turkey has long vetoed the EU’s right of assured access to NATO assets
(Missiroli, 2002). Turkey has approached this issue from an instrumental
perspective, believing that the credentials of Turkey’s European identity 
will erode if Europe no longer desires Turkey’s participation in European
security institutions. Such an erosion would in turn exacerbate Turkey’s
security concerns, with the likely possibility that Europe might be con-
sidered more as a ‘threat’ than a ‘security provider’. 
In view of this security culture, the Turkish ruling elite has not always
interpreted the conditions put forward by the European Union positively. In
principle, full democratization, the creation of a liberal economic order and
adoption of the EU’s Community Law have all been regarded by the Turks
as legitimate EU demands. However, some aspects related to Turkey’s
domestic and external context have given rise to anxiety. Delegation of sov-
ereignty to supranational EU organs in Brussels and substate authorities
inside the country, recognition of the Kurdish citizens of Turkey as a distinct
minority group with guaranteed rights to education and publication in their
mother tongue, and the use of EU-induced political pluralism by political
Islamists and Kurdish separatists are anathema to the Kemalist state elite.3
Trapped in the infamous ‘Sèvres Syndrome’, the Turkish ruling classes
have viewed the granting of more authority to local administrations and
recognition of the cultural, social and educational rights of different ethnic
communities as moves against the unitary nation-state character of the
Turkish Republic. To them, if EU membership were to result in increased
pluralization and liberalization of the political structure, with the unitary
character of the Turkish nation-state strongly challenged, then the EU acces-
sion process would constitute one of the greatest threats to the national
interests. Both preservation of the territorial integrity of the country and
maintenance of the secular democratic credentials of the republic are deemed
by the establishment elite as ‘nationally sensitive’ issues.4 In the view of the
establishment, both partitionist Kurdish fractions and fundamentalist
Islamist groups would find a niche in Turkey’s prospective membership in
the EU.
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4 See the opening speech of Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of National Defence, at the ASAM
(Eurasian Strategic Studies Centre) Conference on Globalization, Security and Nation-State, Ankara,
15–16 June 2002.
01_Security Dialogue 34/3  20/8/03  3:37 pm  Page 293
However, the issue that seems to have created the greatest pressure on the
Turkish elite has been the EU’s demand that Turkey settle all its territorial
disputes with Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus by the end of 2004. If
the Greek Cypriots join the EU before Turkey and as representatives of the
whole of Cyprus, and if the Aegean disputes are decided by the International
Court of Justice in The Hague in line with Greece’s interests, Turkey will feel
that it has been encircled in strategic terms by the European Union and
Greece. Given that one of the pillars of Turkey’s security culture consists of
the continuation of the strategic balance with Greece in and around the
Aegean Sea and Cyprus, Turkey has hastily interpreted the EU accession
process as a threat to Turkey’s security because further ‘Europeanization’
would result in the loss of Turkey’s relative strategic advantages vis-à-vis
Greece (Barlas & Turan, 1999).
Turkey’s Security Culture and the Attractiveness of
Non-EU Options
One important factor that seems to inhibit Turkey’s internalization of the
EU’s security identity is its close strategic relationship with the United States
in Eurasia, Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. However, it should be
noted that this foreign policy course was not Turkey’s first option but 
gradually came into being as the European Union turned down Turkey’s
membership application. Even though the majority of the political parties
and the public have advocated Turkey’s EU membership, they have found
themselves backing non-EU alternatives as they perceived the EU to be dis-
criminating against Turkey.5
Nevertheless, there have also been other factors that have facilitated the
likely implementation of such a non-EU option. First, the security culture of
the Turkish Republic made it possible to cooperate with the United States in
the above-mentioned regions. Both Turkey and the United States are used to
operating in the international arena in accordance with the principles of
realpolitik. Second, the 1990s witnessed an increase in quality across the
whole range of Turkish–Israeli relations, which has fostered bilateral co-
operation in economic, social and military areas. To mention one example,
the two countries signed a sophisticated military agreement in 1996. These
strategic relationships with the US and Israel have not represented an aber-
ration in terms of Turkey’s security culture. The three countries’ threat per-
ceptions vis-à-vis weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles to
deliver them have been similar. Third, US administrations have not forced
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Turkey to undergo a radical transformation process in order to become a
model for the newly established states in the region. To them, the secular and
homogenous nature of the Turkish nation-state was a good model for those
countries to emulate. For the USA, Turkey’s stability has always come before
Turkey’s democratization (Kramer, 2000: 223–231). Fourth, US interests in
the above-mentioned regions have most of the time coincided with those of
Turkey. And, fifth, US administrations have always expressed support for
Turkey’s march to the EU,6 and have played the role of consoling Turkey
when it has been rebuked by the Europeans. 
Prospects after 11 September: Anything New?
Turning to developments in the post-11 September era, one can rightfully
claim that Turkey’s chances of being included within the EU have radically
increased from a security perspective. There are a number of convincing 
reasons why the EU should offer Turkey a clear membership prospect.
First of all, if the ideational boundaries of Western civilization, of which the
EU constitutes an important part, are defined by the struggle against global
terrorism, then Turkey’s case for EU membership will likely become
stronger. This is so because Turkey has struggled with separatist and funda-
mentalist terrorism for decades.
Second, if the European Union wants to see its security interests preserved
and its security model applied to the global struggle with terrorism, then
Turkey’s incorporation into the EU family is highly significant. This is so
mainly for the following reasons. The post-11 September era has increasingly
exposed Europe to the challenges of global terror. Given that the sources of
global terrorism mainly originate from the Middle East, Turkey’s inclusion
within the EU would enable the latter to rely on Turkey’s advanced military
capabilities in its struggle with such threats. Turkey’s membership in the EU
would bolster the claims of those who argue that the war on terrorism
should not be continued on the basis of a clash of civilizations between the
developed Christian North and the undeveloped Muslim South. Moreover,
Turkey’s EU membership would also imply that it is not predestined that a
country whose population is overwhelmingly Muslim and whose economic
power lags far behind those of the developed countries can never join the
EU, currently a Christian club of developed European states.
Third, if the EU’s security is based on efforts to embrace and engage with
regions to the East and South, the EU will not be able to achieve ultimate 
security by fixing its borders at some definite point and excluding a number
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of countries outside the EU area (Richmond, 2000). Thought of this way, leav-
ing Turkey outside the EU and treating it as a barrier against soft (more 
dangerous) and hard (less dangerous) security threats will not operate in
today’s environment because of the globalized and trans-regionalized nature
of security issues in this special part of the world (Eralp, 2000). If Turkey were
to implement all the steps envisaged under the conditions of its EU accession
process but the latter did not admit the former into membership, threats of a
soft security nature to the EU’s stability and prosperity would abound.
It seems that there is a close relationship between the quality of Turkey’s
accession process with the EU and the quality of the EU’s security feeling.
The further Turkey’s domestic structures depart from those of the EU, the
more turbulence and chaos takes place inside the country. The more internal
instability takes root in Turkey, the less secure the EU will feel because the
kind of security threats that the EU is trying to eliminate would abound. 
Fourth, if the transatlantic rift between the EU and the USA further widens
in the years to come (Kagan, 2002), Turkey’s placement in this equation will
become fundamentally important for the EU. If Turkey continues to ally with
the United States and Israel in the region, this would certainly curb the
potential geopolitical influence of the EU. After all, what would be at stake
would be the promise of EU’s security model. The danger for the EU is that
if Turkey were included in the US model, this would curtail the success of
the EU members in terms of both sustaining their model of security in
Europe and transferring it to the peripheries of the continent. In the long run,
this would contribute to the erosion of EU’s security feeling in the region. 
What follow now are some of the positive developments in EU–Turkey
relations that seem to reflect the mood of the post-11 September era. First 
off all, during its Laeken Summit in December 2001 the European Union
invited Turkey to take part in the European Convention scheduled for April
2002. This was a remarkable development given that the EU prior to 11
September had refused to issue an invitation to Turkey, even though it had
invited all the other candidate countries.
Second, Turkey, implicitly or explicitly, encouraged Rauf Denktash, Presi-
dent of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in his efforts to restart
face-to-face talks with President Clerides of the Greek Cypriot Administra-
tion on 16 January 2002. This was an important about-turn on the Turkish
side because Denktash had refused to sit at the same table as Clerides unless
the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was recognized
beforehand.
Third, Turkey and the EU were able to finally reach an accord over the
thorny issue of NATO’s assets around the time of the EU’s Copenhagen
Summit in December 2002.7 Though the Greek government vetoed the so-
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142e.htm.
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called ‘Ankara Understanding’ during the EU’s Laeken Summit in December
2001 (Missiroli, 2002), the sides were finally able to resolve the main frictions
a year later. According to the new arrangement, Cyprus will remain outside
the area of responsibility of the EU’s Rapid Reaction Forces, while Turkey
will lift its veto on the EU’s assured access to NATO’s assets. Behaving in 
this way, Turkey has proved that its intentions were not to contribute to 
further intra-Alliance divisions but to make sure both that the EU’s evolving
security structure develops in close cooperation with NATO and that the
process of Turkey’s accession to the EU accelerates. 
Fourth, the EU finally came to an understanding with Turkey over the
incorporation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and other leftist groups
into its list of terrorist organizations. This might augur well for the prospect
of Turkish–EU cooperation against terrorism. However, the challenge lying
ahead for EU–Turkey relations in this regard concerns the EU’s attitude
towards KADEK, the organization established in the aftermath of Turkey’s
victory over the PKK. Here, the question is whether the European Union will
heed Turkey’s claims that KADEK and the PKK differ only in terms of
means, not ends, and outlaw KADEK. 
Fifth, Turkey and the European Union have had to realize that their inter-
ests in the Middle Eastern Region are not so divergent as some Turkish and
European circles used to believe. In the face of US attempts to depict the Iraqi
and Iranian regimes as members of an ‘Axis of Evil’, Turkey and the EU
member-states, with the exception of the United Kingdom, share the belief
that ‘engagement’, not ‘containment’ and ‘pre-emption’, would be the most
appropriate mechanism for dealing with these regimes. If they succeed in
cooperating over Iraq, Iran and the Caucasus, this might strengthen the 
argument of those who assert that if the EU aims at becoming an important
international actor in the regions surrounding Turkey, Turkey’s inclusion in
the EU would be of great help.
Sixth, the Turkish Parliament passed radical laws in early August 2002 in an
attempt to adapt Turkey’s laws to the EU Community Law. This shows that
there is a willingness on the part of Turkey to internalize the constitutive
norms of the EU’s security modelling. In line with these latest regulations, the
use of non-Turkish mother tongues in education and broadcasting has been
allowed. Furthermore, the new National Strategy Document, also adopted in
August, dropped Greece from the list of prime threats to national security. 
Conclusion
Despite all these optimistic developments following the portentous events of
11 September 2001, if the EU does not commence accession talks with Turkey
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– particularly on the pretext that a solution to the Cyprus dispute was not
reached owing to the intransigent and uncooperative stance of the Turkish
Cypriots and Turkey – then one might expect a gradual deterioration in the
quality of Turkey–EU security relations.8 This would be the case because as
long as the accession process drags on, and as long as this process is built on
vague promises of membership for Turkey, the probability that Turkey and
the EU will view each other as ‘security threats’ will increase. From Turkey’s
perspective, ‘exclusion’ from the EU would accentuate ‘difference’ from the
EU, and ‘difference’ from the EU would increase the probability of ‘conflict’
with the EU.
In sum, Turkey’s EU membership prospects will sky-rocket if the ongoing
accession process succeeds in paving the way for Turkey’s adoption of the
EU’s distinctive security identity and if the EU member-states do not lose
their penchant for turning the Union into an international actor with vital
security interests in Turkey’s vicinity.
* The author is a PhD candidate at Bilkent University, Ankara, and holds a MSc in 
international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and 
an MA in international relations from Bilkent University. His e-mail address is 
oguzlu@bilkent.edu.tr.
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